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At the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, the develop-
ment of Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) models 
has been motivated primarily by a desire to have as ac-
curate as possible forecasts of current and future economic 
conditions for use in the analysis of current monetary poli-
cy. (See Litterman 1984 and the paper by Todd in this 
issue.) Of course, all economic forecasts involve a great 
deal of uncertainty. BVAR models, however, can provide 
reliable measures of the uncertainty of their forecasts. In 
addition, the models can generate probabilities about the 
likelihood of future events. The national monthly BVAR 
model we've developed has also been designed to project 
the likely impacts of unexpected shocks to the economy or 
of changes in Federal Reserve policy.
1 
This paper discusses how the two types of forecasts 
generated by our BVAR model—unconditional (or base-
line) forecasts and conditional forecasts—influence the 
process of monetary policy analysis. The first type, 
baseline forecasts, predicts current and future economic 
conditions, given that the economy behaves as it has in the 
past. The second type, conditional forecasts, can be used 
to answer "what if" questions—questions that ask about 
the implications for the economy if a particular condition is 
imposed. The discussion of conditional forecasts is divided 
into two parts: conditional forecasts that assume no 
explicit policy change and those that assume an explicit 
policy change. (For more detailed discussion of conditional 
forecasting and policy analysis with BVAR models, see 
Doan, Litterman, and Sims 1984 and Sims 1982.) 
Unconditional (or Baseline) Forecasts 
A brief account of the way monetary policy is formulated 
reveals the importance of the baseline forecast to the 
process. The policy formulation process includes three 
basic steps: first, policymakers reach agreement on a 
baseline forecast; second, they consider a set of feasible 
alternatives to the forecast; third, they choose the policy 
stance associated with the alternative that best suits the 
goals of monetary policy—price stability and sustainable 
growth. From this simplified account, we can see that 
preparing a baseline forecast of the likely future course of 
the economy is the first and probably most important step 
in formulating the appropriate stance of monetary policy at 
a given point in time. 
Once prepared, the baseline forecast influences subse-
quent policy formulation in at least two important ways. 
First, it provides the context for considering alternative 
policy options. For example, the lower the rate of future 
inflation predicted in the forecast, the harder it is to support 
an argument that a tighter monetary policy (one with lower 
rates of money growth) is needed to reduce future inflation. 
Similarly, if the forecast suggests low unemployment in the 
future, then it is harder to defend the position that a more 
accommodative policy (one with higher rates of money 
growth) is necessary to reduce the future level of unem-
ployment.
2 
1 The national monthly BVAR model we discuss here is the same used to 
generate the forecasts in the Litterman national outlook paper in this issue. A 
technical appendix describing the model in detail is available on request to the 
Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 
2 When policymakers disagree on the proper stance of policy, their differences 
can frequently be traced not to disagreement on the goals of policy but rather to 
different views about the current economic outlook. For example, at the December 
1983 Open Market Committee meeting, Mr. Martin (FR Board, 1984a, p. 120) 
dissented from the policy action taken because he felt it would "present a threat to 
the sustainability of the economic expansion." In March 1984, Messrs. Gramley 
and Wallich (FR Board, 1984b, p. 514) dissented from the policy action taken 
because in their view "the strength of the economic expansion warranted more 
restraint now"; in contrast, Mr. Martin (p. 514) felt the policy was too tight "in light 
of the vulnerability of key sectors of the economy to rising interest rates." 
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A second way the baseline forecast influences policy 
formulation is by acting as a benchmark against which 
alternative scenarios or policy options are compared. 
Some assumption about future policy will be embedded in 
the baseline forecast—usually an assumption of no change 
in current policy. Alternative assumptions are then gener-
ally considered in terms of their impacts on the baseline 
forecast. In this way, the forecast also plays a key role in 
defining the range of policy options. For if policymakers 
generally agree on the direction and magnitude of the 
effects a change in policy stance will generate, then 
agreement on the baseline forecast together with the effects 
of these changes defines the set of feasible choices. Thus, 
the role of the baseline forecast is crucial because a 
different baseline forecast will lead to a different set of 
feasible outcomes for the economy, and the preferred 
policy from this set is likely to be different from the 
preferred policy chosen from a different feasible set. 
Measures of Uncertainty 
Unlike standard econometric models, which rely on 
judgmental adjustment of their forecasts, BVAR models 
use a statistical approach that requires no such adjusting. 
A major benefit of this approach is that it provides more 
information about our forecasts by allowing us to generate 
scientific measures of their uncertainty. In many respects, 
these measures are as important as the forecasts them-
selves. They can be used to produce confidence bands— 
bands which enclose a region of outcomes around the 
forecast and indicate the probability that actual outcomes 
will fall within the region. (For examples of baseline 
forecasts with confidence bands, see Charts 1-3 of the 
Litterman national outlook paper in this issue.) 
The confidence bands surrounding our model's base-
line forecasts are 70 percent wide: this means that actual 
values can be expected to fall outside these bands almost 
one-third of the time. Readers not familiar with the 
uncertainties of macroeconomic forecasting may be sur-
prised by how wide these bands are. As measures of 
uncertainty, however, they give policymakers important 
information. An example where measures of uncertainty 
provide important information is the problem of forecasting 
state revenues. (For a detailed discussion of this problem, 
see Litterman and Supel 1983.) Because policymakers in 
state government must trade off the costs of excessive 
taxation with the costs of possible revenue shortfalls, 
quantification of the size of likely shortfalls is a key piece 
of information in deciding how large a reserve ftind to 
maintain. The degree to which standard models are in-
adequate in providing information of this kind is apparent 
when we try to make sense out of the alternative scenario 
analyses which commercial forecasting services often 
provide as their measures of uncertainty. 
Probabilities of Future Events 
More than just providing measures of uncertainty, the 
BVAR model provides a realistic, multivariate probability 
description of the possible future paths of the economy. 
What this means is that the model can provide the answer 
to any question about the probabilities of future events. 
For example, policymakers are often interested in knowing 
how likely it is that a particular event, such as a recession, 
will occur over a given time period. All such questions can 
be answered by running the model through a large number 
of simulations and counting the proportion of times the 
event of interest occurs. (The results of such an experiment 
in describing the probability of a U.S. recession appear in 
the Litterman national outlook paper in this issue.) 
Why can't other models be used in the same way to 
answer questions about the probabilities of events? Actu-
ally, they could—if we could trust their results. The key 
difference between BVAR models and standard ones in 
this respect is that BVAR models do not require judgmental 
adjustment in order to generate reasonable results. Just as 
we can't trust standard models' forecasts or their measures 
of uncertainty because they are not accurate unless sub-
jectively adjusted, we can't trust the answers that such 
models would generate to these types of questions. 
Cost is another factor that often prevents standard 
models from being used to answer questions about the 
probabilities of future events. Running a sufficiently large 
number of simulation experiments can be prohibitively 
expensive, especially on standard models. Granted, run-
ning simulation experiments on our complete monthly 
BVAR model tends to be expensive as well; smaller 
BVAR models, however, are relatively inexpensive to 
simulate. So for many purposes we might be willing to look 
just at the results from simulating a smaller model, such 
as the core sector of our model. For example, one such 
BVAR model, whose forecast accuracy has proved com-
petitive with standard models, can be simulated using a 
microcomputer. (This model is described in Litterman 
1984.) 
Beyond the Baseline 
The uses of our BVAR model discussed so far have been 
founded on the baseline forecasts generated by our model. 
While these uses certainly are an important part of the 
31 policy analysis process, it may be necessary to go further. 
Often we are interested in knowing what the implications 
are if some condition is satisfied. Because these "what if' 
questions require that the stated condition be imposed, 
they must use conditional forecasts, rather than baseline 
forecasts, to generate answers. There are, however, two 
kinds of conditional questions, each requiring very different 
kinds of assumptions before the model can generate 
conditional forecasts that provide satisfactory answers. 
Conditional Forecasts I: 
No Explicit Policy Assumptions 
The first kind of conditional question is one which asks 
only about the implications of some event occurring. For 
example, What are the implications for the economy 
if stock market prices rise by 10 percent? This kind of 
question is relatively easy to answer, at least in the sense 
that it requires no explicit additional policy assumptions, 
merely a mathematical manipulation (known as taking a 
conditional expectation) of the probability structure in-
herent in the baseline forecast. In particular, if the question 
concerns the effect of an event today on the forecast, the 
answer is given directly by a certain representation of the 
model's structure, called the impulse response functions. 
The set of response functions (the moving average rep-
resentation of the model) is defined as the responses of 
the model to a particular set of one-time shocks. This 
representation provides a complete description of the 
dynamic structure of the model which, when depicted 
graphically, is much more comprehensible than the usual 
representation given in terms of the coefficients of the 
model's equations. 
The responses of several of the model's variables to our 
hypothetical shock to stock prices are shown in Charts 1-
4. These responses can be interpreted in two ways. First, 
we can think of them as representing how the system 
would respond if it were at rest (that is, if the current and 
past values of all system variables were zero) and then 
were subjected to a one-time shock to stock prices. 
Second, we can interpret the response functions as the 
change in a forecast that would occur as a result of a one-
time surprise change in the shocked variable.
3 The re-
sponses shown indicate that, as a result of the stock price 
shock, there is an initial surge in growth—inflation-ad-
justed gross national product (real GNP)—that dwindles 
by the end of two years. The growth surge is associated 
with a sustained reduction in unemployment and is also 
accompanied by rising inflation. 
In Table 1, we show how the response functions can be 
added to the baseline forecast to give a direct answer to the 
original question. Thus, the forecast, conditional on a rise 
in stock prices, is just the baseline forecast plus the re-
sponse functions, aggregated and expressed as quarterly 
growth rates. 
Defining a Shock 
When we refer to a stock price shock, or to any other type 
of "what if' condition, it is important that we be extreme-
ly precise about what we mean by that condition. In 
particular, when we think of a shock to stock prices, do we 
mean to take into account those other changes in variables 
usually associated with stock price changes? In the 
responses shown in Charts 1-4, we have considered an 
increase in stock prices that has no effect in the current 
period on the values of any other variables in the model. 
This definition of the shock makes sense if we think of the 
stock price movement as being caused by something not 
expected to have any contemporaneous impact on the 
other variables in the system. Of course, such an assump-
tion may be highly suspect, especially if stock price shocks 
historically have been strongly correlated with some other 
variables. This method of defining what we mean by a 
shock, however, is just one possibility. 
Another way to define a shock is by choosing an 
ordering of the model's variables and then including as part 
of the shock those components of movements in variables 
ordered after the shocked variable. For example, if stock 
prices were said to be first in an ordering, we would include 
as part of the stock price shock a contemporaneous 
movement in each remaining variable in the model. The 
size of these components of the shock would be based on 
the way unexpected movements (called innovations) in 
stock prices have varied historically in relation to con-
temporaneous innovations in each other variable. This 
definition of the shock to stock prices makes sense if we 
want to act as if we know nothing about what caused the 
3In our BVAR model, stock prices are modeled as being very close to a 
random walk—an assumption that today's value is the best forecast of a variable's 
future values. In continuous time, the response function of such a variable looks 
like a step function. The response function shown here, however, follows a very 
different shape for two reasons. First, we use monthly averaged data. In this case, 
an increase in the variable implies that its value at the end of the month is most 
likely to be higher than the monthly averaged value; this, in turn, implies that there 
will be a further increase in the most likely value for the following month. Second, 
we take quarterly averages of the monthly averaged data. In this case, we model a 
shock in the third month of the quarter. Thus, the shock to stock prices shows up 
only to a small extent in the quarter in which it occurred and is followed by a large 
increase in subsequent quarters, as shown in Chart 1. 
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Charts 1-4 
Responses of Selected Variables 
to a 10 Percent Rise in Stock Prices 
Chart 1 Stock Prices 
(Index: 1941-43 = 10) 
Chart3 Unemployment Rate 
(% of civilian labor force) 
i 2 4 6 
Quarters After Shock 
Chart2 Growth (Real GNP) 
i change at annual rate) 
2 4 6 
Quarters After Shock 
Chart4 Inflation (GNP Deflator) 
(% change at annual rate) 
0 2 4 6 
Quarters After Shock 
Sources of basic data: Standard & Poor's 500-Stock Index; U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor 
2 4 6 
Quarters After Shock 
current stock price shock and nothing about the contempo-
raneous movements in any of the other variables. Ulti-
mately, the right way of defining the shock to answer the 
original question depends on precisely what we mean by 
the condition "a rise in stock market prices." 
A Variation 
The answer to the stock price question was fairly simple 
because the condition only involved the effect of one 
particular shock to the system. Other conditional forecasts 
of this type are often slightly more complicated because 
the condition implied in the question is more complicated. 
For example, we might ask, What is the implication for the 
economy if stock market prices rise by 10 percent over the 
next twelve months? In this question, the condition does 
not define a single shock. What we can do to answer the 
question, though, is to generate the forecast which satisfies 
the condition and is the most likely, given the probability 
33 Table 1 
Projected Effect of a 10 Percent Rise in Stock Prices* 
Actual Data, 1 st Quarter 1983-3rd Quarter 1984; 
Projected Values, 4th Quarter 1984-4th Quarter 1986 
On Stock Prices 
(% Change) 
On Real GNP 
(% Change) 
On Unemployment Rate 
(% of Civilian Labor Force) 
On Inflation (GNP Deflator) 
(% Change) 
Actual Data  Actual Data  Actual Data  Actual Data 
or Baseline  Response  Conditional  or Baseline  Response  Conditional  or Baseline  Response  Conditional  or Baseline  Response  Conditional 
Period  Forecast  Function  Forecast  Forecast  Function  Forecast  Forecast  Function  Forecast  Forecast  Function  Forecast 
Quarterly** 
1983:1  36.06%  _  _  3.31%  —  _  10.37%  —  —  5.04%  — 
1983:2  47.56  —  —  9.38  —  —  10.10  —  —  2.62  —  — 
1983:3  7.01  —  —  6.81  —  —  9.40  —  —•  3.10  —  — 
1983:4  0.57  —  —  5.95  —  —  8.47  —  —  4.37  —  — 
1984:1  -12.38  10.09  7.87  _  _  4.42  —  — 
1984:2  -11.00  —  —  7.10  —  —  7.47  —  —  3.34  —  — 
1984:3  12.85  —  —  1.89  —  —  7.47  —  —  3.72  —  — 
1984:41  14.68  16.93%  31.60%  -0.95  0.04%  -0.91%  7.39  0.00%  7.39%  4.27  0.00%  4.27% 
1985:1  0.98  44.37  45.35  2.38  0.54  2.92  7.39  -0.02  7.37  2.89  0.02  2.90 
1985:2  2.76  3.00  5.75  3.54  0.88  4.42  7.39  -0.08  7.30  3.40  0.07  3.48 
1985:3  361  -1.77  1.84  4.41  0.81  5.22  7.35  -0.16  7.19  3.39  0.12  3.52 
1985:4  2.54  -1.02  1.51  4.48  0.60  5.07  7.35  -0.23  7.08  3.00  0.15  3.15 
1986:1  3.29  -1.57  1.72  4.07  0.31  4.38  7.25  -0.27  6.98  3.30  0.17  3.47 
1986:2  3.37  -0.62  2.74  3.82  0.09  3.91  7.20  -0.30  6.91  3.20  0.19  3.39 
1986:3  3.33  -0.06  3.27  3.74  0.02  3.76  7.18  -0.31  6.87  3.18  0.20  3.38 
1986:4  3.30  0.14  3.44  3.77  0.01  3.78  7.17  -0.31  6.87  3.32  0.22  3.54 
4th Quarter Over 4th Quarter 
1984:4/1983:4  0.23  3.51  3.74  4.44  0.01  4.45  -1.07  0.00  -1.07  3.94  0.00  3.94 
1985:4/1984:4  2.46  9.81  12.28  3.70  0.71  4.41  -0.09  -0.23  -0.32  3.17  0.09  3.26 
1986:4/1985:4  3.32  -0.53  2.79  3.85  0.11  3.96  -0.13  -0.08  -0.22  3.25  0.20  3.45 
•The conditional forecast, indicated by shading, shows the effect of the stock price shock. The forecast is determined by adding the impulse response functions to the model's baseline 
forecast. Due to rounding, the sum may not precisely equal its components. 
"Percent changes are at annual rates. 
t The hypothetical shock to stock prices occurs in December 1984 of this quarter. 
Sources of basic data: Standard & Poor's 500-Stock Index; U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor 
structure defined by the model. Another way to put this— 
and this is the way we proceed computationally—is to ask, 
What is the most likely set of innovations (which formally 
means the smallest set where the measure of size, or 
metric, is defined by the covariance matrix of innovations) 
which, when input as shocks to the model, leads to a path 
that satisfies the condition? (The details of this necessary 
computation are given in Doan, Litterman, and Sims 
1984.) 
Conditional Forecasts II: 
With An Explicit Policy Assumption 
A much more difficult problem arises when the conditional 
question either directly or indirectly requires an explicit 
assumption about policy. Suppose the question is, What 
are the implications for the economy if the value of the 
dollar drops by 10 percent? We could answer this 
question, just as we did the earlier question about stock 
prices, by defining a particular shock and using the impulse 
response functions to generate a conditional expectation. 
Such an answer is apt to be much less satisfactory in this 
case, however, because the value of the dollar both re-
sponds to and is a concern of monetary policy. 
Suppose we are asking the question because we are 
concerned that unless the Federal Reserve responds to a 
fall in the dollar, the drop will cause an increase in future 
inflation as imports become more expensive and domestic 
competitors raise their prices. If we define the depreciation 
in the dollar as last in an ordering of variables (so that a 
shock to the dollar includes no components of other 
variables) and then generate the conditional expectation, 
our answer includes not only a definition of the structure of 
the shock but also an implicit policy assumption: it 
assumes that everything in the economy, including mone-
tary policy, responds in the most likely way. In this case, 
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without defining monetary policy, we still have included it 
in the forecast. 
This conditional expectation assuming policy as usual 
is shown in Charts 5-10. First, we show the hypothetical 
shock to the value of the dollar. Next, we indicate the 
response of interest rates (the 3-month Treasury bill rate) 
to the dollar depreciation; this response shows that the 
dollar depreciation can be expected to lead to higher 
interest rates. Then we show the effect of the depreciation 
on four other variables. The overall effect of the dollar 
shock on growth (real GNP) is rather small. There is, 
however, stronger growth in the money supply (Ml) as a 
result of the shock. The dollar shock has virtually no 
impact on stock prices because we assume that the dollar 
depreciation is not associated with any contemporaneous 
change in other variables. Stock prices are found to behave 
such that if the dollar shock has no immediate impact, 
there is not likely to be a significant delayed effect on stock 
prices either. Although the net effect of the dollar shock on 
expected real growth is very small, it does cause a large 
increase in the inflation (GNP deflator) forecast. 
What if the original question about the effect of the 
dollar depreciation were motivated by a concern over what 
happens if the Fed does not respond as usual to the fall in 
the dollar? Would the conditional expectation of the effect 
of the dollar depreciation, assuming policy as usual, be a 
satisfactory answer? No, not very. The problem with the 
answer is that it builds in the usual policy response, 
whereas we're worried about what would happen if this 
usual policy were not followed. Thus, as with the previous 
question about stock prices, we have to be very careful 
about what we really mean with our question. One way we 
might make our question more precise is by asking, What 
is the likely effect of a 10 percent depreciation of the dollar 
if the Fed attempts to hold interest rates along the path 
generated by the baseline forecast, rather than responding 
as it has in the past to such a shock? (That is, What is the 
effect if the Fed tries to hold interest rates at the level they 
would have been if the dollar shock had not occurred?) 
Now, however, we have raised a more difficult question— 
a question which the BVAR model alone cannot answer. 
For we cannot project the effects of this new monetary 
policy until we add an explicit assumption about how 
monetary policy actions designed to hold interest rates 
along a given path would contemporaneously affect the 
other variables in the system. 
Defining What We Mean By Policy 
Answering a question about policy in the context of the 
BVAR model thus requires us to define what we mean by 
policy in terms of the model's variables. As it turns out, we 
can answer this kind of policy question if we can define a 
type of shock that represents the contemporaneous impact 
of a one-time Fed action, such as an unexpected open 
market operation. Once we have defined that shock, we 
can then use the impulse reponse functions to map out the 
entire dynamic impact of this shock, which we will call a 
Fed policy action. We then define what we usually refer to 
as monetary policy as a sequence of Fed policy actions. 
Finally, by summing up the dynamic responses caused by 
a sequence of policy actions, we generate the response of 
the system due to the impact of that monetary policy. 
Problems With Our Definition 
We might feel that this definition of monetary policy as a 
sequence of Fed policy actions is problematic for a 
number of reasons. For one, it may not be easy to define a 
particular shock that represents the contemporaneous 
impact of a Fed policy action. We might suspect, for 
example, that the impact of a Fed action might depend on 
the circumstances in which it is taken. After all, the Fed 
does not directly control any of the variables that appear in 
our BVAR model. The Fed actually has a number of 
actions it can take in terms of open market operations, 
changing the discount rate, imposing credit controls, and 
so forth. It may not be realistic to assume that the con-
temporaneous impact of the underlying Fed actions on 
the observed variables in the model can always be 
modeled as a scalar multiple of the same linear combina-
tion of innovations. We might suspect, for example, that as 
the Fed takes stronger actions, the impact is not always 
linear in terms of the observed effects. Perhaps small 
actions show up only in interest rates, but large actions 
may have important impacts on the value of the dollar, 
stock prices, and other variables. 
Another problem in our definition could arise because 
Fed actions can occur throughout a month, rather than at a 
particular point within a month. Even if the immediate 
impact of a Fed action is adequately represented as a 
scalar multiple of a vector of changes in variables on a 
daily or weekly basis, the impact of the action will generate 
a dynamic response; when represented in monthly aver-
aged data, the effect will depend on at what point during 
the month the action took place. In general, the result will 
not be a scalar multiple of the same combination of 
components. Suppose, for example, that the Fed action in 
daily data is simply a change in interest rates, but that after 
a delay of two weeks the money supply also begins to 
35 Charts 5-16 
Effect on Selected Variables 
of a 10 Percent Depreciation in the Value of the Dollar* 
1 st Quarter-3rd Quarter 1984, Actual; 
4th Quarter 1984-1986, Projected 
Charts 5-10 
I. No Explicit Policy Assumptions 
_ Actual 
\mm Baseline Forecast 
»••• Shocked Forecast—Policy as Usual 
Charts 11-16 
II. With Explicit Policy Assumption** 
__ Actual 
• •••• Shocked—Policy as Usual 
mum Shocked—Explicit Policy Assumption 
Chart 5 Value of Trade-Weighted Dollar 
(Index: March 1973=100) 
Chart 11 Value of Trade-Weighted Dollar 
(Index: March 1973 = 100) 
Chart6 Response of Interest Ratesf 
(3-Month T-Bill Rate) (%) 
-
...-••* 
/ i  Higher Interest Rates 
I 1 I 1 
Chart 12 Response of Interest Ratesf 
(3-Month T-Bill Rate) (%) 
-
-
Fed Policy Action 
_  / to Lower Interest Rates  A 
to Baseline Path 
i i I i i i i i i i i i 
Chart7 Growth (Real GNP) 
(% Change at Annual Rate) 
Chart 13 Growth (Real GNP) 
i Change at Annual Rate) 
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I. No Explicit Policy Assumptions (cont.)  II. With Explicit Policy Assumption** (cont) 
Chart8 Money Supply (M1) 
(% Change at Annual Rate) 
v 
Chart 14 Money Supply (M1) 
(% Change at Annual Rate) 
_l I I L_ 
Chart 9 Stock Prices (S&P 500) 
(Index: 1941-43 = 10) 
Chart 15 Stock Prices (S&P 500) 
(Index: 1941-43 = 10) 
ChartIO Inflation (GNP Deflator) 
i Change at Annual Rate) 
Chart 16 Inflation (GNP Deflator) 
(% Change at Annual Rate) 
Z_l I I I I I I I I I I L 
•Effect of hypothetical shock occurring in December 1984 
**The explicit policy assumption is that the Fed responds to the dollar depreciation by holding the interest rate to the predetermined path set by the 
baseline forecast. 
t The response of interest rates is shown as the deviation from the baseline forecast. 
Sources of basic data: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor, 
Standard & Poor's 500-Stock Index 
37 change. The Fed action in monthly data will then affect 
both components if the action occurs in the first half of the 
month, but only the interest rate component if it takes place 
in the last half. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we might worry 
about the Lucas critique; the criticism that the structure of 
the system may not be independent of the sequence of Fed 
policy actions taken. (See Lucas 1976.) If the behavior of 
agents in the economy depends on aspects of monetary 
policy which have remained stable over the model's 
historical sample, then when those aspects of policy 
change, agents' behavior can also be expected to change in 
ways that cannot be predicted by the model. The resulting 
change in the structure of the economy would mean that 
the impulse response functions, which describe the econo-
my's response to policy, would change. Policies designed 
under the assumption that the responses will be the same 
as observed during some earlier period may therefore not 
generate the desired results. 
On the one hand, none of these problems can be easily 
dismissed They suggest just a few of the reasons why 
policy analysis is a very difficult task and why any policy 
analysis involves a large degree of uncertainty. On the 
other hand, there is no reason, in principle, why the policy 
responses predicted by our BVAR model would not be 
correct when the policy actions considered are similar to 
those observed in the historical period over which the 
model is estimated. Even though BVAR models do not 
explicitly include expectations variables, they can, for 
example, be expected to generate correct predictions as 
long as expectations are affected by policy in the same way 
as they have been in the past. And although it may be 
difficult to defend the identifying assumptions necessary in 
order to use BVAR models for policy analysis, it should be 
recognized that these problems are not unique to the 
BVAR modeling technique. To generate policy conclu-
sions, all models require similar identifying assumptions, 
which are likely to be difficult to defend, and all are thus 
subject to a large degree of uncertainty. The reason we 
prefer to use BVAR models for policy analysis is that the 
most crucial assumption we make in using any model for 
policy analysis—and the one likeliest to be the most 
difficult to defend—is that the model incorporates a 
reasonable probability description of the economy. Be-
cause we believe the forecasting evidence suggests that 
BVAR models have a definite advantage in this respect, 
we feel more comfortable using this type of model for 
many kinds of policy analysis. 
Still, we must keep in mind that all of our projections 
have large degrees of uncertainty and that the confidence 
bands we could generate around our conditional forecasts 
would be at least as wide as those discussed in the 
Litterman national outlook paper in this issue. Moreover, 
since no formal statistical procedure is used to generate our 
explicit policy assumptions, the confidence bands cannot 
take into account the additional uncertainty inherent in 
these assumptions. 
Identifying the Effect of a Policy Action 
Recognizing the uncertainties associated with any attempt 
to analyze policy with econometric models, we can pro-
ceed to attempt to answer the question we posed above: 
What would be the effect of a 10 percent depreciation of 
the dollar if the Fed tried to hold interest rates to a 
predetermined path—that is, the one generated by the 
baseline forecast? The first step is to define the vector of 
components that we will identify as the immediate effect of 
a policy action. For this purpose, in the context of our 
BVAR model, we will use a vector that has three nonzero 
elements; in particular, we will assume that Fed policy 
actions have an immediate impact on interest rates, the 
value of the dollar, and stock prices. By immediate we 
mean within the month that the Fed policy action takes 
place, recognizing that problems arise when we consider 
actions occurring at different times of the month. We are 
thus assuming that monetary policy takes at least one 
month to have any impact on real output, inflation, in-
ventories, total credit, and the money supply.
4 
We can generate a rough guess of the appropriate sizes 
of the nonzero components by looking at how these 
variables have changed in recent years in response to 
identifiable Fed policy actions. Although it is never easy to 
quantify Fed policy actions, for the purposes of this 
exercise we have attempted to identify such actions since 
fall 1982. Since that time a very important indicator of Fed 
policy, the federalfunds rate (the overnight rate banks pay 
each other for reserves), has behaved to some extent like a 
step function with some random fluctuation. By looking at 
a plot of the daily time path of the federal funds rate, we can 
identify approximately when changes in Fed policy have 
occurred. On Chart 17, we have identified twelve such 
4Because this kind of assumption is difficult to be very confident about, it 
would make sense to check the robustness of the analysis to this assumption by 
making alternative assumptions and comparing the results. For the purpose of 
illustrating the method, however, we consider just this one possibility. 
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changes over this period.
5 Once the dates of these changes 
are identified, we measure the average level of the funds 
rate before and after these dates and then measure the 
average levels of the nonzero elements (the 3-month 
Treasury bill rate, the value of the dollar, and stock 
prices).
6 We then regress the measured changes in each of 
these variables on the given changes in the funds rate to 
generate estimates of the vector of effects of policy actions. 
This procedure generates an estimate that for each 1 per-
centage point increase in the federal funds rate due to a 
5 The dates of these changes are based solely on a subjective interpretation of 
the data: no attempt has been made to incorporate information on official actions of 
the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve Board into their 
calculation. Some of the changes seem to take place instantaneously, others over a 
period of a few days. These policy changes are also much easier to identify after the 
fact than while they are occurring. The funds rate clearly exhibits a considerable 
amount of random fluctuation; only after the rate has fluctuated around a new level 
for several days does it become apparent that a policy change has taken place. 
6 We measure these nonzero elements during a week centered on the last day of 
the old level and during a week centered two weeks after the first day of the new 
level. We assume that a policy change becomes apparent, and its effects on these 
financial variables occur, during this period. 
Chart 17 
Daily Federal Funds Rate With Steps* 
October 1,1982-November 26,1984 
*The federal funds rate is the overnight rate that banks charge each other for reserves. The steps indicate Fed policy changes, 
based on the author's subjective interpretation of the data. In delineating these steps, no attempt has been made to 
incorporate information on official actions of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve Board. 
Source of basic data: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
39 policy action, we observe a 0.4 percentage point increase 
in the 3-month Treasury bill rate, a 1.4 percent increase in 
the value of the dollar, and a 1.1 percent decrease in the 
stock price index.
7 
Specifying a Sequence of Policy Actions 
Having identified the contemporaneous effect of a single 
Fed policy action in the model's monthly variables, we 
next have to specify the sequence of policy actions we wish 
to use in this exercise. The question we have posed 
(phrased in terms of holding interest rates along a 
predetermined path following a dollar depreciation) is 
made operational by defining the policy action, in this 
context, to be a shock each period with a Treasury-bill 
component large enough to return the interest rate to the 
level generated in the baseline forecast. The sequence of 
Fed actions is then determined by shocking the system 
with a depreciation of the dollar and then following this 
shock by the sequence of Fed actions that causes the level 
of the Treasury bill rate to return to the baseline forecast. 
The policy actions will have contemporaneous impacts on 
the value of the dollar and stock prices, as estimated above, 
but will have delayed effects on all the other variables in 
the system. 
The Results 
The results of this exercise in modeling policy are shown 
in Charts 11-16. We can compare the results of this 
sequence of policy actions with the results in the earlier 
conditional forecast without an explicit policy assumption, 
seen previously in Charts 5-10. Since the conditional 
forecast with an implicit assumption of policy as usual 
predicts the interest rate would rise, we know that the effect 
of the sequence of policy actions is to lower interest rates. 
We also see that the sequence of policy actions leads to 
more rapid money growth than otherwise would have 
occurred. We can thus characterize the policy of holding 
interest rates along the path predetermined in the baseline 
forecast as being a more accommodative monetary policy 
than normally would have been expected. This more 
accommodative policy is modeled as a sequence of 
surprise changes in interest rates. We can see on Chart 12 
that the policy action in the quarter following the shock is a 
lowering of interest rates.
8 The lowering leads contempo-
raneously to higher stock prices as well as to a slight further 
decrease in the value of the dollar. The more accommoda-
tive policy response also leads to higher growth (real 
GNP), but only at the cost of a further increase in likely 
inflation rates, especially after a one-year lag. It is not hard 
to predict that an unanticipated accommodation in mone-
tary policy leads to more real growth and inflation, but the 
model allows us to quantify how much inflation is likely to 
occur and when it will appear—a quantification crucial in 
evaluating the tradeoffs involved in setting policy. 
Notice that the sequence of policy actions and the 
response functions do not, of themselves, define the 
monetary policy in this exercise. What they do define is 
the necessary change in policy, relative to the implicit 
policy incorporated into the conditional forecast The 
exercise thus illustrates how it is not necessary to disen-
tangle current policy from the economic structure in order 
to generate policy conclusions. (Such identification, which 
is a part of traditional policy analysis, would require 
additional assumptions.) 
Variations 
We could, of course, ask more complicated policy-related 
questions such as, What policy-induced path for interest 
rates (or money growth) would be expected to lead to some 
other particular inflation result? In general, there would be 
more than one such path. In order to generate a unique 
sequence of policy actions consistent with a given degree 
of inflation, we would need some additional constraints. 
For example, we could ask, What would be the smallest 
(where smallest might be defined in terms of a minimum 
sum of squares metric) such sequence of policy actions? 
In other cases, we may not want to ask about the effects 
of a particular policy. Instead we may want to ask, What is 
the optimal policy relative to a given loss function? (An 
example of this kind of analysis is described in Litterman 
1982.) The technical details of solving an optimization 
problem make such an exercise appear much more 
complicated, but the basic procedure is really quite similar 
to our policy modeling exercise. In effect we use well-
known mathematical techniques to find a function which 
at each point in time defines the policy action expected to 
minimize the loss function. 
Summary 
The formulation of monetary policy requires the ability to 
continually weigh and choose from among various policy 
7 While the magnitude of these responses is fairly sensitive to the two-week 
interval—the responses tend to increase for at least four weeks after the change in 
funds rate—the ratios of the three variables in the model are fairly stable. For the 
purpose of this exercise, only these ratios matter. 
8 In subsequent periods, however, the policy action may be either to lower or 
raise interest rates, depending on whether the forecast of rates at each period (in the 
absence of a policy action) is above or below the baseline target path. 
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alternatives. For this purpose it is important to have an 
econometric model that can generate accurate forecasts, 
project the range of likely outcomes, answer "what if' 
questions, and predict the effects of alternative policies. 
We have illustrated here how our BVAR model can be 
used to perform each of these tasks. 
Although other types of models have traditionally been 
used to perform these tasks, they generally require signifi-
cant judgmental adjustment in order to generate reasonable 
results. As a result, such models have not inspired much 
trust. The main virtue of the BVAR model is its ability to 
generate a realistic probability description of the future 
course of the economy—a description which does not 
require any adjustment This virtue of the BVAR model 
makes it, we think, a useful tool for both forecasting and 
policy analysis. 
References 
Doan, Thomas; Litterman, Robert; and Sims, Christopher. 1984. Forecasting and 
conditional projection using realistic prior distributions. Econometric Re-
views 3 (1): 1-100. 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors (FR Board). 1984a. Record of policy actions 
of the Federal Open Market Committee. Federal Reserve Bulletin 70 
(February): 115-20. 
. 1984b. Record of policy actions of the Federal Open Market 
Committee. Federal Reserve Bulletin 70 (June): 509-14. 
Litterman, Robert B. 1982. Optimal control of the money supply. Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 6 (Fall): 1-9. 
. 1984. Forecasting with Bayesian vector autoregressions—Four 
years of experience. Paper presented at the American Statistical Associa-
tion's Annual Meeting, sponsored by the Business and Economic Statistics 
Section and held at Philadelphia, Penn., August 12-14. Also, forthcoming 
in proceedings volume and as Research Department Staff Report, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 
Litterman, Robert B., and Supel, Thomas M. 1983. Using vector autoregressions 
to measure the uncertainty in Minnesota's revenue forecasts. Federal Re-
serve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 1 (Spring): 10-22. 
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 1976. Econometric policy evaluation: A critique. In The 
Phillips curve and labor markets, ed. Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer. 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 1:19-46. Amster-
dam: North-Holland. 
Sims, Christopher A. 1982. Policy analysis with econometric models. Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity 1: 107-52. 
41 